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Abstract. To securely leverage the advantages of Cloud Computing,
recently a lot of research has happened in the area of “Secure Query Pro-
cessing over Encrypted Data”. As a concrete use case, many encryption
schemes have been proposed for securely processing k Nearest Neighbors
(SkNN) over encrypted data in the outsourced setting. Recently Zhu
et al.[25] proposed a SkNN solution which claimed to satisfy following
four properties: (1)Data Privacy, (2)Key Confidentiality, (3)Query Pri-
vacy, and (4)Query Controllability. However, in this paper, we present
an attack which breaks the Query Controllability claim of their scheme.
Further, we propose a new SkNN solution which satisfies all the four
existing properties along with an additional essential property of Query
Check Verification. We analyze the security of our proposed scheme and
present the detailed experimental results to showcase the efficiency in
real world scenario.
1 Introduction
In recent years, cloud computing has become very popular. Many companies like
Google, Amazon, and IBM etc. has started providing computing resources as a
service. Migration to cloud is a very lucrative option, as it provides the advan-
tages of pay-as-per-usage, ease of scalability etc. However, the major challenge
lies in the data security where enterprises have to trust the cloud with their data.
Trusting cloud with data is very unnerving for many data owners. To secure
the data a basic solution is to encrypt it using the standard cryptographic tech-
nique such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)[8]. However, this reduces
the cloud to a mere storage repository since AES prevents any operations on
encrypted data. At the other end, Data owner can use recently developed Fully
Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)[11] to encrypt his data. FHE allows compu-
tation of any complex operations directly over the encrypted data in the cloud.
However, the current state of the art FHE schemes are impractical for the use
in real world scenarios.
An alternate approach is to build an efficient and secure solution for a par-
ticular problem at hand. Specifically for this paper, we consider the problem of
SkNN i.e. securely computing the k nearest neighbors of a query point over the
encrypted data. Varying class of solution schemes has been proposed around
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the SkNN problem, like schemes built by using matrix multiplication based
data transformation[22,25,26], schemes that compute SkNN with some level of
approximation[24,14] and the scheme built by using secure 2-part protocols in
federated cloud model[10] etc.
Most recently, Zhu et al.[25] presented a SkNN scheme which uses matrix
multiplication based operation for secure data transformation. They treat Data
Owner (DO) and Query User (QU) as the separate entities. They claim to pro-
vide following properties : (1) Data Security: DO’s data is not revealed to anyone.
(2) Key Confidentiality: DO’s key is not shared with anyone. (3) Query Privacy:
The query information is known only to QU. (4) Query Controllability: QU can-
not compute encryption of a new query point without engaging in a protocol with
DO. However, in this paper we present an attack which allows QU to compute
encryption of a new query point without engaging with the DO, thus breaking
the Query Controllability claim of their scheme.
Further to the above mentioned four properties, we present another essential
property of Query Check Verification which a SkNN solution should provide.
This property allows CS to verify whether an encrypted query being submitted
by QU is actually encrypted by DO or not. In the absence of this property, QU
can choose random values as encrypted query and send it to CS who treats it
as a valid query. This can lead to leakage of data points to QU when he gets
SkNN result set of this fake query. It also leads to wastage of CS computational
resources on computing SkNN for random queries.
In this paper, we present a SkNN solution which provides all of these five
desirable properties. It is the first SkNN solution to have all of these five prop-
erties. Our scheme uses matrix perturbation to maintain data security. We use
an additive homomorphic encryption scheme such as Paillier cryptosystem[15]
to achieve Query Privacy. In our scheme, the DO and CS share a secret which is
used by DO while encrypting the query points. This allows CS to verify the en-
crypted query being submitted by a QU is in fact encrypted by DO. We present
a detailed security analysis of our scheme to show that it provides all the claimed
properties. We also show a detailed empirical evaluation of our scheme to show-
case that it can be used in real world scenarios.
2 Problem Framework
In this section, we formulate the SkNN problem in multi user setting. We de-
scribe the entities involved in the system, the desired essential properties and
the adversarial model against which the solution is assumed to be secure.
2.1 System Entities
We consider a system containing following entities as shown in the Figure 1 :
1. Cloud Server (CS): It is a third-party service provider that provides stor-
age and computation resources to its clients. It will engage with query users
for the kNN queries. Examples of CS are IBM Cloudant, Amazon AWS etc.
Fig. 1. System Entities
2. Data Owner (DO): DO represents an entity who is having the propriety
ownership of the data. In our setting, DO is having the data table D of
d dimensional data points, D = {p1, p2 · · · , pm} s.t. each dimension of the
data point is a real number, i.e. pi ∈ Rd. DO encrypts the table D to D′
{where pi are encrypted to p′i} and then outsources the D′ to CS.
3. Query User (QU): These are the authorized users who want to get the
kNN result for their d dimensional query point q. In our setting, QU will
first engage with DO in a secure protocol to get the valid encryption q′ and
an authorization token T to run a query over CS. QU will send {q′, T} to
CS to get back the list of kNN points.
2.2 Essential Properties
Our objective is to design an efficient solution to the SkNN problem which
achieves the following properties :
1. Data Privacy: Data is a propriety of DO and should not be revealed to the
CS.
2. Key Confidentiality: Key generated by DO to encrypt the data is kept as
a secret form everyone including QU’s and CS.
3. Query Privacy: Query point is private information of QU and should not
be revealed to DO or CS in plaintext format.
4. Query Controllability: For every new query point, QU should engage
with DO to get the encryption. QU should not be able to compute the valid
encryption of a new query point by using the previously encrypted queries.
5. Query Check Verification: CS should be able to verify whether the re-
ceived encrypted query is authorized by DO or not.
2.3 Adversarial Model
We consider the most widely used Honest but curious (HBC) adversary model.
In this model, an adversary is expected to run the protocols as is expected from
him (honesty), but he can do extra processing to infer more information about
the encrypted data (curiosity). We consider the adversarial setting w.r.t. both
the stored encrypted data D′ as well as the encrypted query points q′.
For encrypted data D′, CS will be the HBC adversary whose goal is to infer
information about the plain text of D′ (i.e. about D). Following [25], we evaluate
data privacy in following adversarial models:
– Level 1: Adversary only knows the encrypted values of the points. His goal
is to use this information to infer the plain text value.
– Level 2: Adversary has knowledge about the existence of few plain text values
along with Level 1 adversary information. However he has to figure out the
respective encrypted values w.r.t. plain text values.
For query privacy, both CS and DO act as the adversaries. The DO’s objective
is to learn about the query point during the QueryEncryption phase while CS
can try to learn about the query point from the encrypted query point and SkNN
computation.
3 Background
This section describes the prior SkNN solutions which are related to our SkNN
scheme. It also details out the attack to break the Query Controllability property
of [25].
3.1 ASPE scheme [22]
Wong et al.[22] were the first one to present a SkNN scheme, called ASPE (Asym-
metric Scalar Product Preserving Encryption), which uses matrix multiplication
based data transformation. ASPE uses an invertible matrix M as the key to
encrypt the data points and the inverse matrix M−1 is used to encrypt the
query points. This encryption has the property of preserving the scalar multi-
plication between data point and query point vectors. Their scheme consists of
the following procedures:
– KeyGen : DO generates a (d+ 1)× (d+ 1) invertible matrix M as key.
– TupleEncryption: DO considers a (d + 1) dimension data point vector
p = {p1 , p2 , · · · , pd ,−0 .5 ||p||2} and transforms it to p′, where p′ = p.M.
– QueryEncryption : Considering a (d+1) dimensional query point q = {q1 ,
q2 , · · · , qd , 1} , QU generates a random number r > 0 and encrypt q to q′,
where q′ = M−1.r.qT .
– SkNNCal : CS calculates the kNN by using the euclidean distance (ED)
metric for comparison. For any two plain text points px, py and a query
point q encrypted to p′x, p
′
y, and q
′ respectively, if ED(px, q) < ED(py, q)
then p′x.q
′−p′y.q′ > 0 will hold true. This property is used for comparing the
distances over the encrypted points and thus finding the kNN.
– TupleDecryption : It is the inverse operation on encrypted point p′, i.e.
p = p′M−1.
Wong et al.[22] went on to present an extended scheme under stronger adversarial
model. However both the schemes were presented considering QU and DO as
single entity sharing keys among themselves. Hence it is not able to achieve
the properties of Key Confidentiality, Query Privacy, Query Controllability and
Query Check Verification.
3.2 Zhu et al. Scheme [25]
Zhu et al.[25] built the SkNN scheme by extending ASPE. They claim that the
scheme achieves Data Privacy, Query Privacy, Key Confidentiality and Query
Controllability. The basic idea of their scheme is same as ASPE i.e. matrix
multiplication is used for transformation of data points and query points . The
difference from ASPE lies in: (1)The layout of the plaintext data points and
query points, (2)The co-operative execution of QueryEncryption function by
DO and QU, so that QU doesn’t learn the DO’s key M and DO doesn’t learn
the QU’s query.
The data point p and query point q are represnted for encryption as follows:
p˙ = pi(S1 − 2p1 ,S2 − 2p2 , · · · ,Sd − 2pd ,Sd+1 + ||p||2 , τ , v)
q˙ = pi(q1 , q2 , · · · , qd , 1 ,R{q},0{})
In data point representation p˙, pi represent the i
th dimension of the data
point p, vector S = {S1 ,S2 , · · · ,Sd+1} and c dimension vector τ are the constant
vectors which are generated randomly during the KeyGen function call by DO,
 dimensional vector v is chosen randomly during the TupleEncryption function
call for the data point.
In query point representation q˙, R{q} is c size random vector and 0{} is 
sized zero vector.
pi is an instance of random permutation chosen by DO that is applied to all
data and query points. Overall, {S, τ ,M,pi} is the key of DO used during the
encryption of data points and query points.
For encryption, a n×n matrix M is used where n = (d+1)+c+. While data
points are encrypted by DO as p′ = p˙.M−1, for query point encryption DO and
QU engage among themselves to cooperatively compute the encryption q′ using
the additive homomorphic Paillier encryption scheme [15]. The following additive
homomorphic properties of the scheme are used in the cooperative computation:
1. Epk(m1 +m2) = Epk(m1)×Epk(m2): Given the knowledge of public key pk
and the cipher text of two integers m1 and m2, one can compute cipher text
of m1 +m2 by modular multiplication of Epk(m1) and Epk(m2).
2. Epk(f×m) = Epk(m)f : Similarly, given the knowledge of pk and the cipher
text of integer m. For any integer f , one can compute the encryption of
f ×m by just calculating the modular f exponentiation of Epk(m).
The procedure for computating query encryption between DO and QU is as
follows:
STEP 1: QU generates an instance of paillier encryption scheme {pk, sk} and
encrypts each dimension of query point using the public key pk. It then sends
pk and encrypted dimensions {Epk (q1 ),Epk (q2 ), · · · ,Epk (qd)} to DO.
STEP 2 : DO selects a random number βq and random c size vector R
(q). It
then constructs a partial paillier encrypted vector q¯ s.t. :
q¯ = pi(Epk(q1)
βq , Epk(q2)
βq , · · · , Epk(qd)βq , βq, βq.R(q),0)
Using a vector q¯ and matrix key M a paillier encrypted n sized vector A(q) is
computed s.t.
A
(q)
i =
n∏
l=1
Epk(φl),where φl =
{
Epk(q¯l)
M[i,l] if q¯l is paillier encrypted
Epk(q¯l ×M[i, l]) otherwise
DO sends vector A(q) back to QU.
STEP 3: QU decrypts each component of A(q) using secret key sk to get q′. In
brief, q′ is the transformation of q˙ due to matrix multiplication s.t., q′ = βq.M.q˙T .
The distance comparison operator for kNN calculation of this scheme differs
from the ASPE scheme. For example, considering two plain text points px, py and
a query point q s.t. if ED(px, q) > ED(py, q) then correspondingly in encrypted
formats p′xq
′ − p′y.q′ > 0 will hold true.
Though the scheme achieves the claimed properties of Data Privacy, Query
Privacy, and Key confidentiality, it fails to achieve Query Controllability. We now
present the attack to break the Query Controllability property of the scheme.
3.3 Attack on Controllability
During the STEP 2 of QueryEncryption, it can be observed that βq w.r.t. q˙
is multiplied to every dimension by the DO. This operation is done over the
paillier encrypted partial query q¯. Then a matrix multiplication is performed
to generate n size paillier encrypted vector A(q). Here also it can be seen that
every dimension is a paillier encryption of a number that is divisible by βq.
Once QU computes the q′ from the paillier encrypted A(q), it can compute the
GCD of all the dimensions which is bound to be a multiple of βq. Mostly the
number extracted is βq as otherwise the plausible reason would be that vector
M.q˙T have some non 1 number as GCD of the dimensions. This occurrence is
highly unlikely as matrix M is randomly generated and w.r.t. every query, q˙
contains a randomly generated vector R(q). QU can then reduce the encrypted
query received in form of q′ = βq.M.q˙T to the form q′ = M.q˙T by dividing each
dimension by βq. Similarly, all subsequent encrypted queries can be reduced to
the form M.q˙T by QU.
QU can then build a Map for the received encrypted queries, mapping plain-
text queries q1, q2, · · · , q$ to the reduced query encryption values q′1, q′2, · · · , q′$
respectively. Now for a specific query qz, which is the linear combination of subset
S of already asked queries. QU need not engage with DO to get the encryption.
Instead, he can just apply the same linear combination over the encrypted queries
of the respective queries of subset S. That will be the valid encryption of the
query qz for the case when βq = 1.
For QU to be free from DO’s encryption engagement, he must initially ask
for encryption of a minimum set of query points which can act as a basis for all
the points in the point space. W.r.t. kNN calculation the point space is d + 1
dimensions where (d+ 1)th dimension is equal to value 1. In the encryption pro-
tocol, QU sends the paillier encryption of the d dimensions of the query point
and DO appends 1 to it as a (d+ 1)th dimension. One such set of query points
which can act as basis point are 0d , e1 , e2 , · · · , ed where 0d is d dimensional
zero vector and ei is the ith row of the d × d identity matrix. With the vary-
ing linear combination of ei vectors, any point can be constructed in the point
space. The 0d point is added to adjust the (d + 1 )th dimension to 1. For exam-
ple in (2 + 1 )d point space with queries of form q = {q1 , q2 , 1}, the basis query
points are (0 , 0 ), (1 , 0 ) and (0 , 1 ), every other query point can be formed by
linear combination of these points and the adjustment to 1 in 3 rd dimension
can be done by point (0 , 0 ).
Example of Attack: We take the example presented in [25] to show the attack.
We will first show that the βq is leaked to QU. Then we will show an example for
computing the encryption of new query point without the involvement of DO.
The elements involved in the QueryEncryption function involve, DO’s key
matrix M, permutation instance pi, and QU’s instance of paillier scheme (pk, sk).
The instances of the elements are as follows:
M =

6.7 1.2 2.6 3.3 5.5
9.2 45 11 3.2 19
17 1.5 8.3 2.1 14
30 2.9 16 20 6.2
11 28 3.6 23 13
 , pi = {3, 1, 4, 5, 2}, c = 1,  = 1, d = 2
A. Revelation of βq : Consider a query point (13, 97).
STEP 1: QU sends {Epk(13), Epk(97)} to DO.
STEP 2: DO choses a random c dimension vector R(q) let it be {43} and a
random number βq let it be 131. So vector
q¯ = pi{Epk(13)131, Epk(97)131, 131, 5633, 0}
= {131, Epk(13)131, 5633, 0, Epk(97)131}
Thereafter DO computes vector A(q). Since there are single point decimals in
matrix M scale factor of 10 is considered during the paillier operations. The
elements of vector A(q) are as below:
A
(q)
1 = Epk(131 ∗ 67) ∗ Epk(13)131∗12 ∗ Epk(5633 ∗ 26), Epk(0), Epk(97)131∗55
A
(q)
2 = Epk(131 ∗ 92) ∗ Epk(13)131∗450 ∗ Epk(5633 ∗ 110), Epk(0), Epk(97)131∗190
A
(q)
3 = Epk(131 ∗ 170) ∗ Epk(13)131∗15 ∗ Epk(5633 ∗ 83), Epk(0), Epk(97)131∗140
A
(q)
4 = Epk(131 ∗ 300) ∗ Epk(13)131∗29 ∗ Epk(5633 ∗ 160), Epk(0), Epk(97)131∗62
A
(q)
5 = Epk(131 ∗ 110) ∗ Epk(13)131∗280 ∗ Epk(5633 ∗ 36), Epk(0), Epk(97)131∗130
STEP 3: QU receives A(q) from DO, decrypts it using key sk and adjusts the
scale factor to get q′.
q′ = Decsk(A(q))/10
= (87455.6, 381236.2, 229433.4, 177780.1, 234594.8)
Clearly from the above,QU can easily compute the βq = 131 using GCD across
all the dimensions of q′.
B. Encryption of new Query Point: Assume, QU wants to compute the
encryption of query point (13, 81) without the DO’s involvement. It will begin
by asking encryption of query points q1 = (0, 0), q2 = (0, 1), q3 = (1, 0).
For q1,
q′1 = {1833.3, 7354.2, 5760.3, 11046.0, 2574.6} when DO selects βq1 = 21 and
R(q1) = 31
q′1/βq1 = {87.3, 350.2, 274.3, 526.0, 122.6} when R(q1) = 31
Similarly for q2, q3 we have :
q′2/βq2 = {462.0, 1931.2, 1466.9, 2804.2, 646.8} when R(q2) = 173
q′3/βq3 = {260.1, 1121.2, 823.6, 1584.9, 388.2} when R(q3) = 97
For qnew = (13, 81), we can see that qnew = 13 ∗ q3 + 81 ∗ q2 − (81 + 13 − 1)q1.
Using this linear combination directly over the encrypted query points we get:
q′new/βqnew = 13 ∗ (q′3/βq3) + 81 ∗ (q′2/βq2)− (81 + 13− 1)(q1′/βq1)
= {32684.4, 138434.2, 104015.8, 198825.9, 46035.6}
The computed q′new/βqnew is correct encryption of qnew. If the DO selectsR
(qnew) =
12391 and βqnew = 1, QU will get the same encrypted value w.r.t. qnew.
4 SkNN Scheme
In this section, we present a new SkNN solution scheme that satisfies all the
properties listed in section 2.2 and then present the security arguments for the
security of the proposed solution.
4.1 Verifiable SkNN Scheme
Following we present the formal procedures for Verifiable SkNN scheme that
satisfies all the desired properties.
KeyGen: There are two sets of keys generated during this phase: (1)Keys that
are generated by DO for encrypting the data points, (2)Keys that are jointly
agreed upon by DO and CS, to be used for query verification.
– DO generates parameters {M,pi, τ ,S} as key, where M is a randomly gen-
erated n× n invertible matrix, pi is an instance of random permutation of n
values, and τ, S are randomly chosen c, (d + 1) dimensional vectors respec-
tively. Here, n = (d+ 1) + c+ .
– DO and CS jointly agree upon key pair < KSBC ,W > where KSBC is key of
secure block cipher like AES and W is randomly generated η × η invertible
matrix where η = n+ l.
TupleEncryption: DO encrypts the d dimensional data point p using the keys
generated in KeyGen procedure. For encryption, DO first generates the  dimen-
sional random vector v and then considers the vector p˙, s.t. p˙ = pi(S1 − 2p1 ,
S2 − 2p2 , · · · ,Sd − 2pd ,Sd+1 + ||p||2 , τ , v) and encrypts it as follows:
p′ = p˙.M−1
QueryEncryption: This procedure essentially provides the security w.r.t. de-
sired properties of Query Privacy, Key Confidentiality, Query Controllability,
and Query Check Verification. The procedure is jointly executed by DO and QU
as below:
STEP 1: QU generates an instance of paillier encryption scheme {pk, sk}
and encrypts each dimension of query point using the public key pk. It then
sends pk and encrypted dimensions {Epk (q1 ),Epk (q2 ), · · · ,Epk (qd)} to DO.
STEP 2: DO selects a random number βq and random c size vector R
(q).
It then constructs a partial paillier encrypted vector q¯ s.t.
q¯ = pi{Epk (q1 )βq ,Epk (q2 )βq , · · · ,Epk (qd)βq , βq ,R(q),0}
Using the vector q¯ and matrix key M a paillier encrypted n sized vector A(q)
is computed s.t.
A
(q)
i =
n∏
l=1
Epk(φl),where φl =
{
Epk(q¯l)
M[i,l] if q¯l is paillier encrypted
Epk(q¯l ×M[i, l]) otherwise
STEP 3: DO choses l size query check vector C (q) and encrypts it with
Secure Block Cipher using the key KSBC , i.e T = EKSBC (C
(q)). DO then
appends the check vector C (q) to the end of vector A(q), i.e. qˆ = {A(q),C (q)}.
Using a vector qˆ and matrix key W a paillier encrypted η sized vector B (q)
is computed s.t.
B
(q)
i =
η∏
l=1
Epk(φl),where φl =
{
Epk(qˆl)
W[i,l] if qˆl is paillier encrypted
Epk(qˆl ×W[i, l]) otherwise
DO sends vector < B (q), T > back to QU.
STEP 4: QU decrypts each component of B (q) using secret key sk to get q˜.
In brief, q˜ is the encryption of q˙ obtained as transformation due to matrix
multiplication operations and T is a query validity tag which will be required
by CS for verification of the query.
SkNNCal: In this procedure, CS first verifies the query and then calculates the
corresponding k nearest neighbors. The steps followed by CS on receiving the
query < q˜, T > from QU are a follows:
STEP 1: Query Check Verification: CS applies inverse matrix multiplication
operation on q˜ w.r.t. matrix W to compute the vector < q′,C (q) > and
then checks the Verifiability Condition, i.e, if (C (q) == DKSBC (T )) . If the
condition is true CS proceeds with STEP 2, otherwise reports the fake query
back to QU.
STEP 2: kNN Calculation: CS computes the kNN by using the distance
comparison operator as explained in section 3.2 and the sub vector q′ com-
puted in STEP 1. Thereafter, CS sends the kNN result set to QU.
TupleDecryption: This procedure just applies the inverse operation over the
encrypted point p′, i.e. p˙ = p′.M . From p˙, the data point is extracted by removing
the S vector randomization and vector v.
4.2 Security
The security of the system is considered from the data and query point of view.
Data Security: The data encryption procedure of our scheme is similar to the
scheme proposed by Zhu et al.[25], likewise we claim our scheme to be secure in
the level-2 adversarial model. In brief, the security argument for data privacy
lies in the usage of random vector v and the invertible matrix M−1. The random
vector v used in the data point representation p˙, provides the randomness, as
it changes with every data point, and matrix M−1 transforms the point p˙ to p′
using matrix multiplication.
Query Security: QueryEncryption and SkNNCal procedures bring security
concerns w.r.t. defined properties of Query Privacy, Key Confidentiality, Query
Controllability and Query Check Verification for the Query Users, Data Owner
and Cloud Server.
Query Privacy: With respect to DO, QU achieves the Query Privacy by using
semantically secure Paillier Cryptosystem[15] for encrypting the query parame-
ters that are sent to DO. DO performs further operations of QueryEncryption
using the additive homomorphic properties of Paillier Scheme. With respect to
CS, the security argument is similar to the Data Privacy privacy argument and
lies in the usage of random vector R(q) and multiplication with the invertible
matrices M and W that are unknown to CS.
Key Confidentiality: The keys used by DO during QueryEncryption process
are M,W,KSBC. For QU to infer M and W, he has to build a system of
equations mapping q˙ to q′. But since for each query point encryption DO chooses
a random βq, R
(q), and an independent vector Cq, the random variables in such
system of equations increases with the addition of every new equation, thus
making the system unsolvable. The secrecy of key KSBC of secure block cipher
depends on the strength of cipher scheme. For our scheme, we used AES which
is a standard thus assuring confidentiality.
Query Controllability & Query Check Verification: Query Controllability and
Query Check Verification properties provide double security against the pre-
sumptive fake queries from QU. While Query Controllability disallows QU to
infer valid encryption of any new query, Query Check Verification property dis-
allows SkNN execution for any random vector put forward as a query point
to CS. QU can break the controllability in two ways (1) With the knowledge
of keys of DO for encrypting new query, that means Key Confidentiality claim
fails, which is against the presented argument for Key Confidentiality (2) Com-
pute the encryption of new query using previously encrypted queries, i.e. create
a valid pair of < q˜ψ, Tψ > w.r.t. new query qψ, where q˜ψ = {W.{q′ψ, C(qψ)}T },
q′ψ = M.{pi{βqψ .(qψ , 1),R(qψ),0}}T , and Tψ = EKSBC (C(qψ)). Following we
give the counterargument against the creation of such valid pair:
1. Creation of valid q˜ψ from previous encrypted queries require some linear
combination over the encrypted counterparts. We know, for each query DO
chooses βq,R
(q) randomly and chooses C (q) independently. And for any lin-
ear combination to work, QU must either extract and remove the vectors
R(q),C (q), or extract and remove the value βq from the received encrypted
query q˜. Both of which are perfectly hidden in the unextractable form due
to matrix multiplication operations of M and W .
2. QU can’t create any tag of any check vector as he doesn’t know the key
KSBC .
Thus the scheme is secure.
5 Experiments
Fig. 2. Time to break Zhu et al [25]
Fig. 3. Query Encryption Time
This section presents the emperical evaluation of the SkNN scheme proposed
in this paper and the controllability attack on Zhu et al.[25] outlined in this
paper.
Experimental Setup : We implemented the SkNN scheme proposed in this
paper and the attack on Zhu et al.[25] proposed in this paper in java. We also
implemented the SkNN scheme proposed by Zhu et al.[25] in java to compare
Fig. 4. Database Encryption Time
(Data Points = 1000000)
Fig. 5.Database Encryption Time (Di-
mension = 10)
Fig. 6. kNN Computation Time At
Cloud (Data Points = 1000000) Fig. 7. kNN Computation Time At
Cloud (Dimension = 10)
the performance. We used AES encryption with a keysize of 128 bits as the
symmetric cipher between the Data Owner and Cloud for query verification.
We used Paillier encryption with a keysize of 1024 bits to maintain the query
privacy. All experiments were performed on a Mac with Intel Core i7 2.7 GHz
CPU and 16 GB memory. We set the scaling factor to 106, allowing real numbers
with upto 6 decimal places. Other parameters used are c = 2,  = 2 and l = 2.
Breaking Query Controllability of Zhu et al.[25] : We automated
the attack to break the controllability of SkNN proposed by Zhu et al.[25]. The
attack code works by first engaging with Data Owner to get the encrypted tokens
for the basis vectors. Then the GCD of each of the encrypted token is calculated
and then token is divided by this GCD to get reusable encrypted tokens for the
basis vector. When presented with a new random query point, the attack code
uses the reusable encrypted tokens to find a encrypted token for the new query
point. To verify whether the encrypted token generated by our attack code is
correct, we run the SkNN with the encrypted token output by our attack code
and compare the result with plain text kNN for the query point. We ran our
attack code 10000 times, each time generating a new random query point, and
found that the kNN returned by the encrypted token returned by our attack
code and plain text kNN are same. This testifies to the correctness of our attack
on the controllability of SkNN proposed by Zhu et al.[25]. Figure 2 shows the
time taken by our attack code to generate the encrypted token. The time shown
includes the time to get the encrypted token for basis vectors. It clearly shows
that our attack scales linearly with number of dimensions taking around 14
seconds for 100 dimensional data. This showcases the practicality of our attack.
Performance : We compare the performance of Query Encryption, Database
Encryption and kNN evaluation for the SkNN scheme proposed in this paper
with SkNN scheme proposed Zhu et al.[25].
Figure 3 shows the time taken to encrypt a query point. The figure clearly shows
that our query encryption runs slower than that of Zhu et al.[25], though in ab-
solute numbers there is not much difference. Even for 100 dimensional data our
scheme is able to encrypt the query in less than 1 second. Our scheme is slow
because it is doing additional work of adding a l dimensional random vector
to the query point along with computing AES encryption of this vector. This
additional work allows us to achieve query controllability.
Figures 4 and 5 show the time taken to encrypt the database. Since the data
encryption procedure is same in both the schemes, the time takes is also the
same.
Figures 6 and 7 show the time taken to find the kNN at the cloud server. The
figures clearly show that our scheme takes slightly more time than Zhu et al.[25].
This is due to the query verification done by the cloud server. Note that this
verification is done once for query and is independent of the number of data
points.
From the above discussion it is clear that the performance of our proposed
scheme is comparable to the state-of-art scheme of Zhu et al.[25] and it is able
to achieve query controllability and query verification which [25] fails to achieve.
6 Related Work
There has been a considerable amount of research in the area of secure query
processing over the encrypted data. Solutions varying from specific secure predi-
cate evaluation like text search[19], kNN[10,22,24,25], range predicate[1,5,4,6,18]
etc. to full database level secure systems [21,17,23] exist in the prior literature.
For this sections we present the brief overview of the solutions build up for the
secure databases and the prior secure kNN techniques.
Secure Databases: The secure database systems Monomi[21] and Cryptdb[17]
used multiple encryption schemes to give support for multiple SQL predicates.
They used OPE (order preserving encryption)[5,4], Paillier encryption[15] and
SEARCH[19] schemes to provide support for the range predicate, addition and
search queries respectively. Both the schemes fail to support complex queries
where multiple operators are involved in a single query. In schemes[2,3], cloud
uses the secure hardware for secure computation where the encryption keys are
stored. For complex computations, the data is first decrypted at the secure hard-
ware, then processed for evaluation and then the answer is encrypted back and
sent back to client. This model is different from our work where cloud server
is not trusted with encryption keys. SDB[23] performed query processing with
a set of secure data-interoperable operators by using asymmetric secret-sharing
scheme. They provided protocols to handle queries having across the column
computations.
SkNN Work: [20,7,16] presented the schemes in different problem setting
where data is stored in the plaintext format at cloud and kNN is jointly computed
by cloud and query clients in oblivious manner. We already gave an overview of
the schemes of Wong et al.[22] and Zhu et al.[25,26] which uses the matrix mul-
tiplication based solutions. Hu et al[13] built a system for secure index traversal
using secure privacy homomorphism encryption scheme[9]. They modeled the
kNN solution by building the traversal protocols over encrypted R-Tree index
structure. Yao et al.[24] proposed the solution in stronger security model IND-
CPA[12] (indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack) where the other
schemes were failing. They showed that building SkNN with IND-CPA secu-
rity is at least as hard as building IND-OCPA[5] (indistinguishability under
ordered chosen plaintext attack) OPE. They presented the IND-CPA scheme
using Voronoi partitions that computes the approximate nearest neighbor for
2-dimensional data. Yousef et al[10] presented the protocols in the federated
cloud model where one cloud stores the encrypted data and the other cloud
has the key information. They built multiple secure protocols which are used
in SkNN evaluation. Their solution provides the strong security guarantees but
takes a lot of time in SkNN evaluation. Lei et al[14] proposed a SkNN solution
for 2-dimensional points by using LSH (Location sensitive hashing). They first
construct the secure index around the data and then outsource the data and in-
dex to the cloud. Since the scheme uses LSH data structure, their result contains
false positives.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we presented an attack to break the Query Controllability claim
of the SkNN scheme proposed by Zhu et al. The underlying scheme revealed
the extractable information in the encrypted query, which is used to build the
attack. As an addendum, we introduced the essential property of Query Check
Verification and presented the SkNN scheme that satisfies Query Check Verifi-
cation along with all the basic properties: Query Controllability, Query Privacy,
Data Privacy, and Key Confidentiality.
We also performed the experiments to verify the attack on the scheme of Zhu
et al. and to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme.
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